

Ethics, Geography and Responsible Citizenship [1]

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ABSTRACT *Responsible citizenship requires moral accountability. Geography educators need to give greater attention to the teaching of professional ethics as part of our contribution to the education of responsible citizens. The paper introduces an approach which couples the case method with a jurisprudential inquiry model as a means by which geography teachers might contribute effectively to this education. The approach requires students to review a case involving an ethical dilemma, assess it against relevant normative ethical theory and social standards, and make the best possible decision about the dilemma which they can defend coherently in public.*

KEYWORDS Ethics, geography, citizenship, case method, jurisprudential inquiry.

[T]here can be no more relevant item on the curriculum of our students than the ethics of their professions. The aim of such curricula will not, of course, be to impart ‘right answers’ but rather to make students better acquainted with the best moral thought, and more equipped to reason about the ethical issues they will undoubtedly face.... Universities are failing if they do not address themselves to these particularly complex issues. (Brenda Gourley, installation speech as Vice-Chancellor and Principal, University of Natal, 1994 in Smith, 1995, p. 271).

What are Responsible Citizens?

“The education system must be tailored to the needs of productive and *responsible citizenship* in the global economy.” So stated the authors of the US Geography Education Standards Project (GESP) in 1994 (p. 9, emphasis added). There is evidence of similar claims in places other than the US. For example, the Australian Education Council’s National Goals for Schooling give clear emphasis to issues of citizenship (Conolly, 1996, p. 24). If the *Oxford English Dictionary* is to be believed, a responsible citizen is someone who, amongst other things, is morally accountable for his/her actions. This takes us firmly into the territory of ethics. Accountability requires an understanding of

ethics embedded in practical contexts and intellectual disciplines coupled with the capability to assert and defend one's moral position and social behaviours. Without a self-critical awareness of the moral dimensions of one's actions, how can one be a responsible citizen?

In this paper we discuss a means by which geography teaching can allow us to contribute more effectively to the education of responsible citizens. In so doing, we are also taking up Smith's (1995, p. 274) call "to consider ways in which (higher) education might more fully and effectively engage moral issues". First, we ask why geography educators should be interested in the teaching and learning of ethics. We then go on to talk about one of the ways in which we might go about that teaching. The procedure we discuss involves the case method enmeshed with a 'jurisprudential inquiry' model.

Why Ethics?

Aside from any intrinsic imperative that ethics should be a part of the education of responsible citizens, there are other compelling reasons for geographers to give attention to ethics in their curricula.

First, ethical behaviour helps protect the rights of individuals, communities and biophysical environments. As social and physical scientists interested in 'making the world a better place', we should avoid (or at least minimise) doing long-term, systematic harm to those individuals, communities and environments (Mitchell & Draper, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978; Peach, 1995). Achieving this objective requires both technical expertise and a keen understanding of the society within which (social) science is undertaken (Harrison, 1986, p. 37).

Second, ethical behaviour may help assure the climate of trust in which our students, in their future roles as academics and teachers, planning consultants and market researchers, environmental managers and tourism analysts, statisticians and census takers, may continue their socially and environmentally useful labours (Jorgensen, 1971; Mitchell & Draper, 1982; Walsh, 1992; American Association for the Advancement of Science [AAAS], 1995).

Third, in the face of a mountain of evidence of corruption, scientific misconduct and impropriety from around the world (Nicol, 1989; Zinn, 1991; Clarity, 1997; Goering, 1997) there are now emerging public and institutional demands for individual accountability (AAAS, 1995). Schools, universities, funding agencies, employers and professional societies seek to protect themselves legally from the unethical or immoral actions of an employee, member or representative. For example, Ohio University (1986, p. 1) states that one of the three fundamental purposes of its formal consideration of ethical matters is: "*to protect the interests of Ohio University*" (emphasis added). Closer to home, recent television news reports in Australia have documented controversial efforts by the Salvation Army to ensure that its employees are practising Christians as one means of minimising the risks to the Army of employee misconduct.

Fourth, as Rao (1986) and Frazer and Kornhauser (1986) suggest, events of the late twentieth century are exposing us and our students to increasingly challenging moral and ethical dilemmas. We will all have to resolve the ethical issues associated with medical and genetic advances, deal with Internet censorship, balance environmental issues with economic and demographic imperatives, and cope with global inequalities in the distribution of food, wealth, health and jobs. There is no need to dwell on these matters so long as the point is made that the world in which our geography students will live

is such that the traditional concerns of ethics—what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’—are coming to have an even more profound significance than ever before.

Against Prescription in Ethics Education

... the frustration of certainty is morality’s gain. (Bauman, 1993, p. 223)

One strategy for dealing with ethics might be to attempt to provide students in our classes with some clear, unequivocal moral direction in the form of rules such as ‘you should not kill’, ‘do no harm’ or ‘do not tell lies’. This type of approach is one which has certainly been made familiar to many of us through, for example, religious education. Direction of this type offers that sort of unqualified, unambiguous advice which many undergraduate students seek. Moreover, it is an approach which has been pursued by a number of humanitarian and professional organisations in drafting their codes of ethics. For example, the American Political Science Association (1992) insists that a researcher “must refrain from using his or her professional status to obtain data and research materials for purposes other than scholarship”. The American Sociological Association (1989) insists that “Sociologists must acknowledge all persons who contribute to their research and to their copyrighted publications”. The Nuremberg Code (in Reynolds, 1979, p. 436) states that “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential”. Notwithstanding the fact that prescription in ethics pedagogy stands in fundamental opposition to moral *thinking* of the type discussed by Smith (1995), prescriptive approaches to ethics and ethics education are fraught with practical problems. Whilst these are outlined more fully elsewhere (Hay, 1998a, 1998b), let us briefly outline some of them here.

First, the normative ethical positions from which incontrovertible moral and ethical guidance might be drawn often suggest irreconcilably different behaviours. Normative ethics offer the conceptual devices which allow us to distinguish ‘right’ from ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’ from ‘good’ (Jorgensen, 1971). It is common to subdivide normative ethics into two main approaches, distinguished primarily by the different ideas they employ to assess the moral correctness of some behaviour (Davis, 1993).

Teleological, or consequentialist, approaches to ethics are those in which “the good is defined independently of the right, and the right is defined as that which maximizes the good” (Rawls, 1971, p. 24). The morality of acts is evaluated by considering the balance of good over evil produced as a result of those acts (Frankena, 1973; Holden, 1979; Reynolds, 1979; Kimmel, 1988; White, 1988; Peach, 1995). For example, from a consequentialist perspective, one might argue that it would be appropriate for a researcher to disclose publicly the secret and sacred ‘women’s knowledge’ of an Australian Aboriginal community shared in confidence if that disclosure might prevent the construction of a bridge through the sacred places associated with that knowledge.

By contrast, deontological approaches to ethics can be summed up in Quinton’s (1988, p. 216) colourful phrase: “Let justice be done though the heavens fall”. Deontological approaches reject the principle that what is ‘right’ can be determined by assessing consequences. The ‘right’ does not necessarily require maximisation of the ‘good’ (Rawls, 1971). Instead, certain acts are good in themselves and must be viewed as morally right or obligatory because, for example, they keep a promise, show gratitude or demonstrate loyalty to an unconditional command (Kimmel, 1988). From a deontological standpoint, some behaviours may be right or obligatory even if they do not promote the greatest good in a particular situation. If we return to the example of the researcher

given access to sacred, secret Aboriginal 'women's knowledge', a deontological view might require that researcher to maintain the secret trust with which he/she had been privileged, even if non-disclosure meant that construction of the bridge would destroy the sacred places associated with that knowledge. It is clear from this simple example that two different approaches to ethics suggest quite contradictory notions of morally correct behaviour. Which approach might be chosen by geographers and other bio-physical and social scientists to underpin prescriptive approaches to ethics? To that question, there is no easy answer.

A second reason for avoiding prescriptive approaches in ethics education has to do with the non-universality of any 'rules' for moral and responsible behaviour. Even a matter so disturbing as killing another human being is sometimes sanctioned by different societies in times of war or as punishment for crimes.

Third, prescriptive approaches to ethics offer the potential for a contest between 'legalistic' interpretations of ethical behaviour and the 'morality' of individual actions. As Crotty (1995, p. 15) notes, "far from fostering morality, a proliferation of rules tends to detract from it by blurring the need, and limiting the scope, for authentic personal response to moral values". When students and practitioners look for ways to satisfy the letter of ethical rules rather than considering the morality of their behaviour, can their conduct really be understood to be responsible?

Last, but by no means least, it is unlikely that ethical prescriptions can anticipate all possible moral dilemmas. There will be times, therefore, when individual geographers will have to deal with ethical dilemmas without guidance, without 'supervision', and without the input of others. Although Burns (1995, p. 39) was referring specifically to one professional group when he observed that, in many situations, "the sole criterion of ethical performance is the judgment of the good lawyer", his comment applies equally well to geographers. When no one else is 'looking', the monitoring and enforcement of moral behaviour rests with individual, responsible, self-policing citizens.

Clearly, then, prescriptive approaches are problematic. Given this, how else might we, as geography educators, approach the problem of educating ethically responsible citizens?

Making 'Moral Imaginations'

... good ethical reasoning ... must be more than a matter of the mechanical and dogmatic application of rigid rules to fact situations. Ethical reasoning requires thought, insight, and sensitivity. (Tri-Council Working Group, 1997, p. 15)

We should seriously consider rejecting the easy comfort of ethical prescription and, instead, encourage theoretically informed, self-critical and perceptive approaches to moral matters. Rather than seeking to indoctrinate students with local institutional knowledges of ethically appropriate behaviour—presented as codes of ethics or as guidelines for appropriate behaviour—we could ensure instead that we provide our students with the opportunities to develop the moral ensemble associated with responsible citizenship [2]. This is advocacy neither for relativism—the notion that moral truths are culturally and historically contingent—nor for ethical universalism—the idea that there can only be a single truth (Wong, 1993). Instead, it is a call for us to develop in our students those skills which might equip them to navigate carefully the shared territories of justice, beneficence and respect for persons upon which different ethical maps have been laid (Christakis, 1992). This requires us to encourage ethical pluralism

and humility rather than ethical relativism or universalism. Let us discuss that first in the abstract and then in terms of one practical approach we are working on at the moment.

According to Preston (1991), Wilson and Ranft (1993), and the United States Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences (otherwise known as the Hastings Center) (1979) an education in ethics should seek to fulfil a number of important goals, all of which might be meshed carefully into existing geography curricula. These goals are:

- *stimulating the moral imagination*: students' feelings and imaginations must be encouraged. Students must come to appreciate that human beings live in a vast network of moral relationships. Accordingly, the meanings of particular behaviours and moral positions may sometimes be given or understood far from the places they might be expected. For example, the availability of cheap clothing in New York, Tokyo or Sydney may come at the price of Draconian labour relations in Vietnam. Draining a river for agricultural irrigation may be so extensive that residents downstream and across a border are deprived of access to life-giving water supplies. Bloodshed in one part of the world may variously be understood to be genocide or patriotism.
- *recognising ethical issues*: stimulation of the emotions must also be accompanied by the ability to recognise ethical issues in context. Students must be encouraged to investigate the potential moral significance of their own actions and those of other people. This requires the development of skills which might strengthen students' abilities to detect hidden value biases, moral logic and conflicting moral obligations. This understanding of the moral significance of one's actions requires sensitivity to (local) ethical practices (Mehlinger, 1986).
- *developing analytical skills*: students need to acquire some of the 'tools' required to make rational ethical decisions. What is 'right' or 'good'? On what bases are those decisions made? How can we evaluate prescriptive moral statements such as: 'endangered species should (or should not) be protected' or 'research should (or should not) be conducted with the consent of all participants'. This vital part of the ethics education process might initially be served, for example, by asking students if the consequences of some specific action such as defending one's homeland against invaders are the only relevant criteria in assessing its moral validity. Perhaps there are other principles, such as the sanctity of life, so central to human existence that they must be upheld, irrespective of the consequences? This kind of discussion of different perspectives offers a logical accompaniment to reviews of ethical theory (e.g. comparing deontological and teleological approaches to ethics).
- *eliciting a sense of moral obligation and personal responsibility*: teachers need to encourage students to develop answers to questions such as: 'why should I be moral?' or 'why should I think about ethics?' (e.g. because it may help to protect the rights and well-being of other people). Students must be encouraged to embrace ethical thought as an element of their professional and social identity. They need to learn to act morally because it is the 'right' thing to do, not because someone is making them do it (Mehlinger, 1986). Moreover, they might be introduced to the important distinction between behaviour which might be understood to be genuinely moral behaviour and that which is merely legal, conventional or acceptable within a given society (Crotty, 1995).
- *tolerating—and resisting—disagreement and ambiguity*: students should be encouraged to tolerate the disagreements and ambiguities which are almost inevitably associated with ethical problems. However, while tolerance must be promoted, it is

also important to encourage students to seek out the core of differences to see if disagreement might be reduced. The expectation of ambiguity and disagreement should not be offered as justification for abandoning debate and critical thought. Instead, efforts need to be made to find whatever common ground may exist and to minimise ambiguity.

Coupled with these goals of an education in ethics is a pursuit common to all forms of teaching, the dispensability of the teacher. Teaching practice should provide students with the concepts and skills which will allow them to handle moral issues associated with the real worlds of geography independently and advisedly. So, how might all of this be done in practice?

Using Cases to Teach Ethics

The Hastings Institute's pedagogic programme outlined above presents formidable educational challenges which seem unlikely to be satisfied through a traditional lecture-based approach. Instead, the challenges might be better served through an interactive learning approach which, according to Grant (1997): stimulates learning; offers the prospects of greater knowledge retention by students; and contributes to the development of skills such as judgement and problem solving. While there is a variety of interactive strategies such as lectures, role-playing, small-group discussion, debate, simulation, and field experiences which might be used for introducing and dealing with ethical matters in geography classes and professional development sessions (see, for example, Applegate & Entekin, 1984; Agne, 1986; Frazer, 1986; Bensinger Liebman, 1995; Burns, 1995; Weisberg & Duffin, 1995), the case method approach offers some considerable strengths.

As Grant (1997) makes clear, the case method should not be confused with cases or case studies. The latter refer to examples used in lectures and other teaching materials to exemplify themes or concepts. The former refers to a student-centred teaching-and-learning approach in which the teacher's role is to facilitate reflection and focused inquiry, and to promote discussion about some real-world phenomenon whose characteristics are outlined in an article, book, video-tape or other intellectually provocative material. The teacher's role can be achieved through the use, for example, of open-ended questions and the provision of analogies which might point to problems and inconsistencies in class-members' opinions and arguments. The case method has a long and distinguished history in the teaching of law and other fields of professional education (Carter & Unklesbay, 1989; Sykes & Bird, 1992; Brest, 1995).

A number of authors (Carter & Unklesbay, 1989; Brest, 1995; Grace & Cohen, 1995; Grant, 1997) have outlined some of the considerable pedagogic strengths of the case method. The method provides the potential to embed professional knowledge within the contexts of practice and thereby help those new to a field develop the 'situational knowledge' possessed by more experienced colleagues. That is, cases may allow student geographers to be exposed quickly to a wide range of the types of scenes and conditions with which they might be confronted in professional practice [3] and to situate themselves within 'real world' problems. As such, cases offer some potential to bridge the gap between academic geography and everyday life. Cases can help students learn a range of skills such as problem solving, diagnosis, evaluation, decision making and may also be an appropriate means of conveying theory. They force students to see matters from a range of points of view and to consider each one critically and sympathetically. Moreover, cases may inculcate students with the analytical skills and

TABLE I. Syntax of jurisprudential inquiry model.

<p><i>Phase One: Orientation to the case</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Teacher introduces materials 	<p><i>Phase Two: Identifying the issues</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Students synthesize facts into (an) ethics issue(s) ● Students select one issue for discussion ● Students identify values and value conflicts ● Students recognize underlying factual and definitional questions
<p><i>Phase Three: Taking positions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Students articulate a position ● Students state basis of position (e.g. in terms of the social value or consequences of the decision) 	<p><i>Phase Four: Exploring the stance(s), patterns of argumentation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Establish the point at which value is violated (factual) ● Prove the desirable or undesirable consequences of a position (factual) ● Clarify the value conflict with analogies ● Set priorities. Assert priority of one value over another and demonstrate lack of gross violation of second value
<p><i>Phase Five: Refining and qualifying the positions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Students state positions and reasons for positions, and examine a number of similar situations ● Students qualify positions 	<p><i>Phase Six: Testing factual assumptions behind qualified assumptions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identify factual assumptions and determine whether they are relevant ● Determine the predicted consequences and examine their factual validity (will they actually occur?)

Source: Adapted from Joyce *et al.* (1996).

scepticism about easy answers which are required of responsible citizens and members of the geographical community. Finally, cases can serve as an invaluable means of enlivening classroom material.

In the remainder of the paper, we outline an idea for a teaching strategy which draws on these strengths and couples cases with the model of ‘jurisprudential inquiry’ teaching outlined by Joyce *et al.* (1996) (see Table I). The strategy is designed to employ examples of real moral dilemmas to promote discussion and argument. It also requires students to encounter the ethical views of other people and to self-critically review their own moral positions. In more detail, the approach can be summarised as follows.

Following introductory reading and classroom discussion of material exploring ethics and ethical theory (for example, Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Singer, 1993; Hinman, 1994; Koehn, 1994; Peach, 1995; Shrader-Frechette, 1994; Robinson & Garratt, 1996), phase one sees small groups (about 3–4 people) of students presented with a number of ethical conundrums/dilemmas. Whilst the process might be attempted with a lecture group (say 100 students), the pedagogic value of the method—with its opportunities for each student to express and defend his/her position—is most likely to be achieved in smaller classes. About 15–20 students might be considered the maximum class size for effective implementation and operation of the exercise. Cases can take the form of written examples, audio-tapes, or video-tapes of ‘real-life’, ‘no closure’ situations. A number of examples of such situations are provided in Table II. All are based on real

dilemmas encountered in professional practice by researchers in geography and related fields and represent a small part of a collection we have gathered internationally [4].

In the approach discussed by Joyce *et al.* (1996), the dilemmas would not be accompanied by specific questions (e.g. 'what should she do now?', 'should he have done that?'). Instead, students would be required, as phase two of the approach, to decide what the ethical problem is, if one exists at all. To some degree, this contradicts Grant's (1997) counsel. He advocates teacher-preparation of a sequence of questions by which students are led through the case. Whilst this may have merits in some case discussions (e.g. evaluating the prospects of agricultural reform in Europe), it is not quite so appropriate in ethical and other situations where issue/problem identification constitutes a significant learning objective. This is very important, for as Burns (1995, p. 37) notes, "much unethical and deeply destructive behavior results from a failure to see the moral significance of human situations". Abandoning prepared questions for class discussion does not mean, however, that the teacher-facilitator need not anticipate issues which might arise in class! Instead, the teacher should consider each case carefully, think about the ethical issues involved, consider analogous situations which might be raised to provoke discussion and reflection, and develop a series of questions which might stimulate discussion in the unlikely event that students are completely bewildered by the case.

Problem identification can be achieved through a process of discussion and negotiation in the classroom. Although it will be difficult, students should avoid taking a stand at this stage. Instead, they should simply be trying to identify the nature of the ethical problem. If a number of small groups are discussing a case simultaneously, the teacher-facilitator might conclude phase two by asking representatives from each group to tell the rest of the class about the ethical problem(s) they have identified within the case. These can be reviewed by the class as a whole, summarised, and re-presented as a smaller number of issues for general discussion in the next phase of the exercise.

Phase three requires students to formulate their own position on the issue which has been identified by the class or teacher and to support that stand. It seems prudent to provide students with the opportunity to prepare their answers to the problems independently and in writing. This might be done in class or as a take-home exercise. Providing students with the opportunity to prepare a considered opinion obviates the common difficulty of students 'passing the buck' and avoiding offering a solution to, or comment on, a troubling moral problem when they are asked to speak about it in class (Hastings Center, 1979). It may also help instil in the quieter students, who might otherwise be disinclined to speak, the confidence required to speak out in small groups and in the larger class when the time for that arises.

In phase four, students' independently prepared notes on the ethical scenario(s) form the basis of small-group in-class discussions and then Socratic dialogue with the teacher and perhaps with peers. The Socratic method is most commonly associated with legal education and typically involves a teacher asking students questions about a case under study in an attempt to reveal the underlying principles of law embedded in the case under scrutiny (Carter & Unklesbay, 1989). Prompting towards a 'correct' answer is uncommon. The emphasis is on learning principles, concepts and problem-solving rather than learning 'right' answers. Critical listening skills may also be developed by teacher and students. All participants must follow each speaker's substantive contribution to the group's dialogue. Speaking skills may also be developed by students through their efforts to persuade the teacher and the rest of the class of the validity of their viewpoint (Grant, 1997). The Socratic method appears to offer some real value in ethics education. In

TABLE II. Some examples of real ethical dilemmas encountered by geographers.

Example 1. Means to an end:

In Oldport, USA, the mayor commissioned a firm of planning consultants to develop a comprehensive 20-year strategy for urban renewal and for the provision of housing, schools and social service facilities. The planning consultants' preliminary report projected moderate population growth, but pointed to the likelihood of a substantial change in racial composition. It was estimated that minority groups would make up more than half of the city's population within 12 years. The planners also predicted that there would be an African-American population majority in the public schools within 5 years.

The mayor reacted very strongly to the preliminary report. She felt that if the findings were released, they could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Her hopes of preserving an ethnically integrated school system, maintaining stable, mixed neighbourhoods, and developing an ethnically heterogeneous city could be dashed.

The mayor asked the planners to reconsider their population estimates. They agreed to use the lower range of their projections. These suggested minority dominance in the public schools after 8 years and a majority in the city in 16. The mayor was not happy. She told the planners to change the figures or to leave them out of the report. The planning consultants refused, arguing that they had bent their interpretation of fact as far as they could. They also thought that without a discussion of those population projections, the rest of the report would be unconvincing.

In private, the mayor criticised the planning consultants for their professional arrogance. She went on to ask a member of her own staff to rewrite the report without the projections and ordered the consultants not to make public their findings under any circumstances. The mayoral staffer initially refused to write the report, but eventually agreed. The consultants kept quiet about the results, completed the formal requirements of their contract, and left. After this experience, the mayor never used professional planning consultants again. (This example is drawn from Marcuse (1985, p.5).)

Example 2. Secret wilderness:

A British geographer used a geographic information system (GIS) and other techniques to map the wilderness continuum in the UK. Her intent was to identify the wildest and most remote areas in the UK. The problem she faced was this: should she publish and draw attention to many wild areas (particularly in Scotland) that are presently unprotected so that they may be formally protected by law (there are currently plans afoot to extend the National Park system of England and Wales into Scotland), while knowing full well that she will simultaneously be drawing these areas to the attention of the recreationalist lobby looking for a wilderness experience? If the work is not published, then the risk is that these areas may go unprotected when park boundaries are formalised.

Example 3. No more fruit-picking:

A young Australian geography graduate looks unsuccessfully for a job for almost a year. During that time he manages to find some short-term employment as a fruit-picker. He also does some work for no payment with a local government body to help build up relevant work experience. During the year he faces setback after setback as he is the 'runner up' for one job after another. Eventually, the young geographer manages to get a position with a major consulting firm which does work in areas which interest him very much and for which he is well qualified. The job is 'casual' for 3 to 4 days each week. The rate of pay is hourly and the firm is not obliged to give any period of notice should the man's services no longer be required. In short, there is no security of tenure. One of the first projects the geographer is required to work on in his new job concerns the location of microwave towers across the city in which he lives. The towers are required for mobile telephone communications and there is considerable public debate and anger about the health risks associated with microwave transmissions. There is also widespread community concern about the aesthetic implications of the towers.

Example 4. Grass?:

Ethnographer David Fetterman was conducting field research in a US inner-city area for a contract research corporation by which he was employed. One of the research 'subjects', known by Fetterman to have an extensive knowledge of illegal drug dealing in the local area, asked Fetterman out for something to eat. In the course of that interaction, the researcher was confronted with a number of dilemmas. Fetterman (1983, pp. 216–217) describes the situation:

TABLE II—Continued.

“We walked down the main street of the inner city for a few blocks until he pointed to a health food store.... We entered the establishment and my friend asked the clerk to give me a granola [muesli] bar. I said thanks and reached for the bar. The patron handed it to me with a smile and a small envelope underneath it. I looked down at a ‘nickel’ bag of marijuana.... My [feeling of] discomfort was compounded by two policemen walking by viewing the exchange. The policemen saw the transaction, smiled and continued walking. When I asked my friend why they didn’t bust us, he said, ‘they don’t need the money right now.’ I asked him to clarify his response and he explained:

They only bust you if they need the money. They get paid off regular. But if they’re hurting for money, then well, that’s another different story. They’ll come right in and bust ya, take money out of the cash register and take your dope too. If they’re on the run and gotta show that they mean business then they’ll bust your ass. Otherwise they just look the other way.”

Example 5. A lousy place for business:

The Vice-Chancellor (i.e. President) of a university announced a new university commitment to helping the local region and encouraging new industrial developments. A geographer at the same university had recently completed a major study of the region’s local industrial environments. The work revealed that the region had few attractions for industry and that local government was seen by industrialists to be unsympathetic to their needs. The geographer was invited to speak about the attractions of the local region at a high-profile university dinner for people who might invest in the region. It was known that national TV, radio and print media reporters would cover the event.

teaching and learning about ethics, the teacher and other students should confront each speaker with questions about their ethical position and the reasons for it. The teacher and peers can be expected to follow one of four patterns of argument (Joyce *et al.*, 1996, p. 84):

- (1) asking students to identify the point at which some value has been violated;
- (2) clarifying the nature of the value conflict through analogies (for example, what would happen if certain elements or individuals in the scenario were changed?);
- (3) asking students to outline and substantiate the desirable or undesirable consequences of a position;
- (4) asking students to set priorities. Here the teacher might wish to find out from students which value(s) they think should take priority in a particular case and might require them to demonstrate that other values have not been violated grossly.

Questions should not be evaluative or disapproving and comments should not make a fool of any student. Those sorts of behaviour may cause considerable anxiety amongst class members as Kober (in Carter & Unklesbay, 1989, p. 532) notes:

“Humiliate the student! it’s good for his mind!” is the battlecry. And the ... professor seizes each new opportunity with relish. Precisely why it is so good for a student to play the buffoon is not entirely clear, but the deleterious effects seem clear enough. The blows to the student’s ego are obvious, particularly when one considers the added tensions which inevitably accompany any form of higher education.

Instead, all those involved in the teaching and learning experience should be probing students’ responses thoughtfully by, for example, questioning relevance and consistency. The teacher needs to make it clear to students through words and actions that the central

purpose of the Socratic questioning is to elicit the clearest, most defensible positions from students. The questioning is not intended to be a rigorous and damaging cross-examination of any single student. "The merits of the case, not the students, are the basis for evaluation" (Joyce *et al.*, 1996, p. 86). It is important in this phase too that the teacher should try to enforce continuity of thought (Joyce *et al.*, 1996), so that one line of reasoning is followed through to its conclusion before other arguments are picked up.

The confrontational approach associated with argument about problematic social issues can be threatening, especially to those students who feel less comfortable with oral communication than others (e.g. students for whom English is a second language), for those who do not come from backgrounds where argument is used commonly as a means of clarifying thought, or perhaps for those who feel especially committed to a particular position (e.g. as might occur in discussions about abortion as part of a strategy for limiting population growth, or about international variations in attitudes to capital punishment). In such situations, students could be asked to work in small groups to formulate a position and to argue that position collectively with another small group. The groups might also be assigned a position to argue, irrespective of their individual beliefs about the case.

Joyce *et al.* (1996) suggest that a single case should be discussed for a long period of time and Grant (1997) allows a 50-minute session for the framing, diagnosis, analysis, recommendation, and debriefing associated with a single case. The exact length of time spent on a case will depend on matters such as the complexity of issues involved and student percipience. Care needs to be taken to ensure that students have the opportunity to reflect on their views, to acquire additional information, and to muster the courage to comment where they might before have been timid. Certainly, our own experience on institutional ethics review committees and in other decision-making milieux supports the view that more time for discussion is better than less time! Upon hearing the carefully reasoned views of a colleague, one's own ethical position may alter.

Closing discussion in phase four can be difficult, but Grant (1997) reviews a number of useful strategies. First, one may simply summarise the discussion without providing an authoritative answer. With some ethical dilemmas, it may be appropriate simply to revisit the range of possible consequences associated with particular courses of action and suggest, for example, that the decision may depend on one's view of the greater or lesser of two evils! Alternatively, one might re-present the case in terms of the normative theory which underpins the dilemma, making clear any opposition which might exist. For example, between solutions suggested by teleological or deontological positions. Second, the teacher-facilitator might point out those areas of discussion which were especially penetrating or insightful and those where additional scrutiny might have been appropriate. Third, one might raise questions which extend or generalise the discussion to other areas and other sites of apparent moral impasse. The teacher-facilitator might take this opportunity to satisfy one of the objectives of Smith's (1995) moral teaching by asking students if the case suggests any general, universal principles against which specific practices and incidents might be judged. Indeed, some of the questions which might be raised could usefully constitute the introduction to subsequent instructional materials and exercises on notions such as moral relativism, universals and responsibilities to 'distant Others'. As a final step in phase four, the teacher-facilitator might debrief the class, offering constructive comments about individual and group contributions and (re-)connecting the discussion with the course's trajectories of concept and content.

Phase five activities are intended to clarify further the reasoning behind a position and require students to refine and qualify the positions they have taken. For example,

students might be required to rewrite their original opinion in the light of teacher and peer comments provided during small-group and classroom discussion. The written work should expand upon, capitalise on and confirm lessons learned through discussions with other students. As such, it should support 'deep learning', characterised by Bradbeer (1996, p. 12) as that process in which "the student engages in an active search for meaning and attempts to relate it to prior learning and experience and, in so doing, transforms the knowledge gained".

Finally, phase six offers additional testing of the students' arguments by checking to see if they can stand up to the most extreme conditions possible. This may be achieved through formal assessment of each student's written work, with the marking being based heavily on criteria such as quality of argument. If time is available, engagement with the thoughtful ethical views of a small group of people can be encouraged through the use of writing groups (see Hay & Delaney, 1994, for a discussion of these and their implementation).

Following Joyce *et al.* (1996), the jurisprudential approach offers a number of outcomes which are clearly compatible with the Hastings Center's goals of an education in ethics. Through the jurisprudential approach, students are encouraged to master the means by which ethical questions may be identified and analysed. They are also provided with the opportunity to practise the conduct of forceful dialogue, which is said to nurture "the capacity for social involvement and arouses the desire for social action" (Joyce *et al.*, 1996, p. 89). Finally, the approach supports the values of pluralism and respect for the point of view of other people.

There may be other ways of exciting moral imaginations, advancing analytical abilities, encouraging moral obligation, and encouraging tolerance to ambiguity, but the model based on jurisprudential inquiry also has the virtues of simplicity, ease of application and cost-effectiveness. As Grant (1997) notes in his discussion of the case method, this sort of approach is also educationally effective. His work lends some support to the claims of philosophers and teachers of ethics who believe the best way to teach ethics is through cases (Hastings Center, 1979). Moreover, as Lamb (1991, p. 1220) reminds those of us familiar with taking students on field trips, "students may forget what they hear, but they remember what they do" [5].

Conclusion

The routinisation of ethical decision making through rigid institutional codes and practices denies or curbs the possibility of responsible citizenship. Prescriptions for appropriate moral behaviour shift accountability away from individual geography practitioners and leave moral minefields into which untrained geographers may venture. Armed with good intentions, but unencumbered with an education in ethics, geographers may find themselves dangerously exposed in these uncharted moral terrains. Our solution is to use the case method coupled with the jurisprudential inquiry approach to ensure that geography students are equipped with critical moral imaginations. These imaginations offer student-geographers the potential to sensitively navigate appropriate routes through the fields of justice, beneficence and respect for others which together contribute to notions of responsible citizenship. Moreover, the long-term development and aggregation of moral imaginations offers the prospect of a deeply entrenched collective and reflexive governance of moral behaviour. That will contribute further to the ongoing development of geography students as responsible citizens.

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NOTES

- [1] An earlier version of this paper was presented by invitation to 'Connections 97. Education for Responsible Citizenship', Fourth International Conference on Studies of Society and Environment held at the University of Sydney, 6–9 July 1997.
- [2] This does *not* necessarily mean that there are no fundamental moral principles. Specific 'rules' or practices might vary from culture to culture, but those rules *may* be grounded in the same overarching principles (Grace & Cohen, 1995).
- [3] Given the diversity of occupations pursued by geography graduates, the provision of cases which students might ultimately encounter in professional practice is not quite as straightforward as seems possible in fields like nursing, law, architecture and medicine.
- [4] Richard Le Heron and Robin Kearns of the University of Auckland have also collected some fascinating cases from New Zealand. They are currently experimenting with computer-based delivery and assessment techniques to employ these cases in upper-level undergraduate topics. If you are prepared to share your stories about any ethical dilemmas you have faced in your practice as a geographer, please forward them to the authors of this paper. We would be delighted to include them in our collection.
- [5] Grant (1997, p. 177) cites work by Stice (1987) which reveals that, 6 weeks after a test, students retain "ten per cent of what they read, twenty per cent of what they hear, thirty per cent of what they see, fifty per cent of what they see and hear, seventy per cent of what they say, and ninety per cent of what they do and say".

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